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PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM II:
PANEL ADJUDICATION

Comments
ANDREW W. SHOYER* AND HEATHER

G.

FORTON**

ANDREw W. SHOYER: The WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures are
working and should be allowed to continue in force. There is no call for wholesale
revisions to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) at this time. There are,
however, several areas that warrant further attention over the next few years.
First, Members should consider modifying current practice so as to protect solutions reached in settlement. Second, Members are likely to develop legislative
responses in the future to controversial panel and Appellate Body reports. Third,
Members must ensure greater transparency in the dispute settlement process,
and should start by making their own submissions public.

I. Protecting Negotiated Settlements
Mutually agreed solutions to matters raised in dispute settlement are "clearly
to be preferred" to recourse to panel procedures or other devices included in
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.' Nearly twenty percent of the requests
for consultation filed by WTO Members during the first three years of the WTO's
*Andrew W. Shoyer is a partner with Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy LLP in Washington,
D.C. From August 1993 through October 1997, Mr. Shoyer served as Legal Advisor in the U.S.
Mission to the World Trade Organization. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect
those of either the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative or the firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer
& Murphy LLP.
**Heather Forton works for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
The views and comments contained in this paper are her own and they do not represent the views
of the Government of Canada or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
1. Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.7, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. Article

3:7 provides, in part, that -[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent
with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred [over the use of panel procedures]." Id.
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existence led to mutually agreed solutions. Several of these solutions experienced
bumpy rides afterward as parties to the settlement disagreed vehemently over
whether the negotiated solution was being implemented.2 One would think that
the DSU would facilitate the implementation of settlement agreements at least
as well as it does the implementation of the rulings and recommendations of the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). However, the DSU is silent on this point.
The parties to those settlements could have helped themselves by including a
clause in the settlement agreements providing for arbitration of disputes arising
out of the agreement. Indeed, the parties could have provided for arbitration
pursuant to article 25 of the DSU. That provision appears to be drafted broadly
enough to encompass arbitration over compliance with a settlement agreement
in a dispute brought under the WTO dispute settlement provisions. Most importantly, paragraph 4 of article 25 provides that arbitral awards are subject to
surveillance under article 21 and the provisions of article 22 on compensation
and suspension of substantially equivalent concessions.
Parties should routinely include in settlement agreements a clause providing
for arbitration pursuant to article 25 of the DSU. In the absence of guidance in
the text of the DSU, however, parties with relatively little bargaining position
might be unable to convince their negotiating partners to include such a provision.
To remedy that situation, Members might consider modifying either article 3 or
article 25 (or both) to instruct parties to a settlement to include such an arbitration
clause in all such agreements to be notified to the DSB.
An even more daring solution would be to modify the DSU to provide in article
1 that "covered agreements" 3 include mutually agreed solutions notified to the
DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, pursuant to paragraph 6 of article
3 of the DSU. Effectively, this step would transform commitments made in
settlements into WTO commitments. This approach would be consistent with the
spirit of DSU provisions requiring that all solutions to matters formally raised
in dispute settlement be consistent with WTO rules.4 This would eliminate any
doubt that article 25 arbitrators could hear conflicts about compliance with a
settlement agreement. It would also create a right to seek the establishment of
a panel to review an alleged breach of the settlement agreement. In addition, it
would create a powerful incentive for Members to notify their settlements, only
some of which have so far been notified pursuant to paragraph 6 of article 3 of
the DSU.
The danger might be, however, that in formalizing settlements, Members will
find parties to a dispute less willing to settle, or less likely to use WTO dispute
2. See, e.g., Korea-MeasuresConcerningthe Shelf-Dfe of Products-Notificationof Mutually
Agreed Solution-Revision, WT/DS5/5/Add. 1 (Apr. 22, 1996) (visited June 12, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm> [hereinafter WTO Website]; WTO Annual Report 1997 at para.
11 (regarding the U.S. complaint on EC tariff concessions on grains).
3. DSU, supra note 1, art. 1:1.
4. DSU, supra note 1, art. 3:5.
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settlement procedures to reach settlements. With several more years of experience
with the DSU, Members will have a better foundation on which to assess whether
this risk is a significant one.
II. Responses to a "High Court"
The introduction of appellate review into the dispute settlement process represents one of the most interesting innovations to emerge from the Uruguay Round.
After only three years, the Appellate Body appears to have had a significant
influence over the way that panels perceive their role and how proceedings should
be conducted. For example, the introduction of appellate review brought much
greater attention than ever before on the need for a written record of the panel
proceeding. Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,5 the Appellate Body required that, upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal,
the WTO Secretariat would transmit the "complete record of the panel proceeding" to the Appellate Body. Rule 25(2) of the Working Procedures defines what
the record includes. As a result, panels and the Secretariat have been forced to
be much more rigorous about the written record created during the proceedings,
and this has affected the manner in which proceedings have been conducted.
The development of a healthy relationship between panels and the Appellate
Body-between court of first instance and reviewing court-will be critical to
the performance of the system. Although the DSU does not require panels to
adhere to decisions of the Appellate Body, panelists as well as the advocates
appearing before them treat Appellate Body reports as high court decisions. They
cite them with great deference, as is fitting. In turn, the Appellate Body decisions
help panels understand how to work within the guidelines that the Appellate Body
sets. In its recent decision in the dispute on the EC's ban on beef from cattle
grown with hormones, the Appellate Body corrected a panel on its application6
of previous Appellate Body decisions regarding the allocation of burden of proof.
The relationship between upper and lower courts necessarily involves a degree
of tension. But if both "sides" (assisted by their respective Secretariats) strive
to maintain a constructive dialogue, then a better jurisprudence will emerge.
Although the Appellate Body can correct the errors of panels, the DSB is not
in an effective position under the DSU to correct the errors of the Appellate
Body. In light of the "negative consensus" rule of paragraph 14 of article 17
of the DSU, and the requirement that Appellate Body reports shall be adopted
"unconditionally," there is little chance for the DSB to fix problems in legal
interpretation that arise in Appellate Body reports. Although Members can com5. Working ProceduresforAppellate Review, WT/AB/WP/3 (Feb. 28, 1997), atWTO Website,
supra note 2.
6. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-AB-1997-4-Report
ofthe Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 99 (Jan. 16, 1998), at WTO Website,
supra note 2.
FALL 1998
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ment on problems that they perceive, the DSB is unlikely to develop consensus
on clarifications or corrections in reaction to Appellate Body reports.
That role is more likely to fall on the Ministerial Conference or the General
Council. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting dynamic that might emerge from
the post-Uruguay Round dispute settlement mechanism will be the legislative
response by WTO Members to decisions taken by the WTO judiciary. In the
past, GATT "law" was developed principally through the work of panels. Even
after the Tokyo Round, there was relatively more jurisprudence than "code law"
(in the form of treaty text). It could hardly be said, however, that successive
trade rounds under the auspices of the GATT 1947 constituted reactions by the
contracting parties to errant panel decisions.
Much has changed in this regard after the Uruguay Round. First, the delegations
that negotiated what became the WTO Agreement created a great deal of "code
law." Second, they created in the Appellate Body a judicial body that functions
like a high court, subject to checks and balances. Third, the Appellate Body
appears to base its interpretations of the WTO Agreement on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rather than on negotiating history or its own understanding of negotiating intent.
The Appellate Body is under enormous time pressure to produce decisions in
increasing numbers of cases. Sometimes, the Appellate Body will interpret the
WTO "code law" with unexpected or unintended results. Perhaps Members will
use their authority under article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement to adopt interpretations to correct the perceived errors of the Appellate Body. Instead, or in addition,
the decisions of the Appellate Body could elicit a legislative response from Members where previously no such legislative mechanism existed. There might come
a day when the agendas of trade rounds are influenced just as heavily by Appellate
Body decisions as they are now by external commercial and economic issues
faced by the trading community. Such a relationship between Members and the
Appellate Body would be extremely useful, because it would improve the quality
of work of those who draft future WTO treaty text and those who interpret it.
III. Ensure Timely Access to Submissions
One of the debates during the final stage of negotiation of the DSU addressed
the implications of the culture of confidentiality inherited from the GATT 1947
procedures. Some delegations argued that the results of the WTO dispute settlement process would never be credible unless the process were opened up to
participation by those non-governmental entities affected by those results. Accordingly, they suggested that non-governmental entities be permitted to attend
and participate in panel and Appellate Body proceedings, submit written briefs,
and have complete access to all documents submitted to panels and the Appellate
Body. In contrast, other delegations argued that protecting the confidential, gov-
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ernment-to-government nature of dispute settlement was essential to the resolution
of disputes. These delegations argued that non-governmental entities had ample
opportunities to participate in and influence the dispute settlement process through
domestic advisory procedures conducted in Members' capitals.
The common ground that developed during the debate was not extensive,
but found its eventual home in paragraph 2 of article 18 of the DSU. Although
no consensus emerged to open dispute settlement proceedings to nonMembers, delegations agreed that the confidentiality rules should not preclude
Members from disclosing to the public statements of their own positions taken
in the course of dispute settlement. This notion was codified in paragraph 2
of article 18 of the DSU. Article 18:2 also provides that, upon the request of
any Member, a party to a dispute must provide a non-confidential summary
of the information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed
to the public.
In practice, implementation of article 18:2 has been rather disappointing. Although the obligation of a Member to provide a non-confidential summary of its
submissions is absolute, there is no deadline by which the party must supply the
summary to the requesting Member. The United States government, as a matter of
domestic law, must request each party to a WTO dispute settlement proceedingregardless of whether the United States is itself a party to the dispute-to provide
non-confidential summaries of its written submissions. 7 Accordingly, the United
States requests as a matter of course that each party to a dispute provide a nonconfidential summary if it has not already made its submissions public. In a
handful of cases during the first three years, parties to disputes did make their
submissions available to the public, but in the vast majority of cases they did not.
Parties that received requests to provide non-confidential summaries responded
slowly, if at all.
The sensitivity of some Members to the disclosure of positions taken before
panels or the Appellate Body is difficult to appreciate in light of the highly detailed
descriptions of arguments that appear in panel reports. In the descriptive portions
of their reports, panels generally defer to the manner in which parties have
articulated their arguments, both in writing and orally during panel meetings.
Indeed, much of the bulk of recent panel reports is attributable to the near verbatim
transcription of parties' arguments and counter-arguments. Thus, the question
whether parties' arguments should be disclosed never arises-it is merely a matter
of time before these arguments are transcribed in panel reports and thereby become
accessible to the public.
The lack of timely access to these arguments is of critical importance, however.
Judging from the increasing worldwide media attention to WTO dispute settle-

7. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 § 127(d), 19 U.S.C. § 3537(d) (1994).
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ment, one may fairly assume that there are increasing numbers of nongovernmental entities that wish to follow closely and, if possible, influence the
course of these proceedings. In their review of the DSU, Members presumably
will reengage in debate on private parties' direct access to panels and the Appellate
Body. In the meantime, however, the limited success in implementing article
18:2 of the DSU allows Members standing firmly in the anti-transparency camp
to have it both ways; they insist that transparency begins (and ends) at home,
rather than in Geneva, but then effectively deny interested parties the material
with which to participate meaningfully in domestic procedures conducted by
Member governments in capitals.
I suggest that the current situation is untenable. Without prejudice to Members'
views on direct participation of non-governmental entities in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, Members should adopt a practice now in the DSB to ensure
that all submissions to panels and the Appellate Body are drafted as public documents and made available to the public at the time they are submitted. Members
could eventually modify the text of article 18:2 of the DSU to require all parties
to a dispute to make their submissions available to interested parties on a real-time
basis. Business confidential information has generally not played a role in WTO
proceedings, but parties should clearly retain the right to protect business confidential information from disclosure.
HEATHER G. FORTON: The dispute settlement system of the WTO has been
functioning effectively, strengthening the discipline within the multilateral trading
system. The panel process is an important aspect of that dispute settlement system.
Notwithstanding the procedural or technical difficulties which have arisen in the
context of various panel proceedings, Members of the WTO are satisfied with
the operation of the dispute settlement system. Members of the WTO have confidence in the system and it is critical that this confidence be maintained to ensure
that the dispute settlement system is used to preserve the strong rules-based
multilateral trading system. In addition, I would maintain that there is a growing
confidence on the part of the business community, which is increasingly viewing
the dispute settlement system of the WTO as a viable alternative in the resolution
of international trading disputes. The review of the system called for in the
Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes will provide Members with an
opportunity to have a considered exchange of views and evaluate the scope for
achieving consensus on introducing some improvements to the operation of the
system in general and the panel process in particular.
It is important to note that Members of the WTO recognize procedural and
technical difficulties encountered through the use of the panel process. However,
the general view is that these difficulties are neither of a nature nor a magnitude
that they have to be resolved at the present time. In other words, if in the context
of the review, Members do not achieve a consensus on how to address the proceVOL. 32, NO. 3
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dural and technical difficulties, the dispute settlement system can and will continue
to function effectively. The issues can then be considered at a later date. It may
be in everyone's interest to let the system evolve a little bit longer before proposing
changes and/or amendments.
The overview provided by Mr. Stewart and Ms. Burr is an important one, as
it informs the reader of some of the procedural questions and issues that have
arisen through the use of the panel process. Due to time constraints, I will only
address some of the points made in that paper.
With regard to the composition panels, the provisions of the DSU were designed
to ensure that panelists were well-qualified and objective. To date, Members
appear to be satisfied with the process for choosing panelists, although there is
an obvious need for more people with expertise in the new areas (i.e., expertise
regarding sanitary and phytosanitary issues, services issues, intellectual property
matters, etc.). I do not believe Members are prepared to consider the creation
of a permanent or quasi-permanent group of panelists, nor do I believe the WTO
has financial resources to even begin considering such proposal.
The issue of amicus briefs has been discussed by Members on numerous occasions, especially amicus briefs presented by environmental NGOs. Although we
cannot predict what will happen in the future, at the present time, the panel
process of the dispute settlement system does not provide for the submission of
amicus briefs by NGOs.
The issue of relitigation is an important one for the system. A panel process
requires significant personnel and financial resources from both the parties and
the WTO Secretariat. I certainly agree with the authors that there is a need to
ensure that a Member's right to bring a dispute to the WTO is protected, but
the exercise of that right should not put excessive and undue strain on the system.
In addition, we must ensure that the system is not used in such a manner that
the defendant is continually litigating the same issue with different Members.
The principle of res judicata must also be respected.
Finally, I agree with the authors that the provisions of the DSU concerning
the implementation and enforcement of the rulings and recommendations of the
DSB are critical. To date, Members' experience with these provisions is not
extensive. We will definitely need more time and a greater understanding of how
these provisions are applied before determining what improvements, if any, are
required.
To conclude, I will return to my initial comments. The review process will
be useful for all Members of the WTO. It will provide Members with an opportunity to exchange views and reflect upon the various issues that have arisen in
the operation of the dispute settlement system. However, I maintain that it is not
essential for the effective functioning of the system that changes or improvements
be introduced at this time. The dispute settlement system has functioned effectively and can continue to do so without the introduction of any changes. It is
in the interests of every Member of the WTO to ensure and strengthen the credibilFALL 1998
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ity of the dispute settlement system, as it is the means by which we can preserve
a strong rules-based multilateral trading system.
John Jackson noted his agreement with
Andrew Shoyer that the dispute settlement system can evolve through the practices
adopted by particular panels. However, some issues cannot be addressed in this
manner. An example of one such issue is whether to establish permanent panels.
Also, some issues are simply too controversial to be dealt with through procedures
adopted by particular panels. These are issues with which the DSB as a whole
is having difficulty grappling.
Steve Charnovitz asked whether any consideration has been given to either
having both parties to a dispute, or having the losing party to a dispute pay
the costs of litigation before the panel. Charnovitz acknowledged that the panel
procedure provides a public good, which may counsel against requiring the parties
to a dispute to pay the costs of litigation. Nevertheless, he wanted to know whether
anyone had proposed this idea.
Heather Forton responded that the idea of requiring parties to a dispute to pay
the costs of litigation has been proposed. However, the principal users of the
dispute settlement system have objected to such proposals. Forton noted that
developing countries are key players in the dispute settlement system. It is costly
for anyone to enter into the dispute settlement process; getting legal advice is
expensive. At least there are some costs that developing countries don't have to
pay directly. It is important to these countries that they do not have to pay the
costs of the Legal Division, the Secretariat, or the Appellate Body, which costs
are absorbed by the WTO budget. The burden on developing countries of a
pay-as-you-go system would not be helpful.
Andrew Shoyer responded that he had not heard about a loser pays system
discussed in Geneva. He believes that a loser pays system is a good idea, since
it would provide an impetus for countries to settle. On the other hand, the WTO
dispute settlement rules are very complainant-friendly, which comes from fifty
years of GATT practice. That fact weighs against adoption of a loser pays system.
A comment was made that a loser pays system would give rise to difficult problems
of collection.
A question arose as to the relationship between panel members and the WTO
Secretariat staff. Forton responded that both a lawyer from the Legal Division
and a lawyer with a substantive specialty from the relevant WTO division (e.g.,
Services or Intellectual Property, Investment and Competition Policy) are assigned to each panel. They assist the panel to the extent required. She noted that
in her personal experience serving as a panelist in the dispute between the United
States and Argentina concerning footwear and textiles, the staff was very competent and helpful to the panel. They enabled the panel to operate as efficiently as
QUESTION AND ANSWER SUMMARY:
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possible. Forton further noted that her experience seems consistent with what
other panelists have experienced.
Regarding qualifications required of panelists, Stewart noted that there is a
roster of panelists maintained by the Secretariat. In general, a panelist must be
serving or have served in his or her respective national government, or be someone
who teaches in the field that is the subject of the dispute settlement proceeding.
He added that the ban on panelists from countries that are parties to the dispute
is not absolute; it can be waived.
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